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The administration of Ferdinand Marcos did not enact any major
changes in Philippine immigration law except for a policy of extending
visas to restricted nationals, principally those from Chinese territory.
Chinese nationals had traditionally received preferential treatment by
the Philippine government, mostly because of their dominance in local
business and industry. The Marcos administration sought to solve the
problem of Chinese nationals overstaying their visas with a program
that allowed the Office of the Solicitor General, by administrative pro-
ceedings, to grant citizenship to qualified applicants. During the
Marcos administration, the Commissioner of Immigration and Depor-
tation ("CID"), through this and other proceedings, unfortunately for-
tified public perception that the agency was riddled with graft and
corruption.
The main thrust of the Aquino administration has been to spot-
light the CID in the campaign against graft and corruption. As part
of this campaign to stop the extortion of illegal aliens, the CID, by
authority of an executive order, launched an alien legalization pro-
gram on August 1, 1988. Subsequently, the Senate passed a resolution
to suspend the program, pending a Senate hearing to determine
whether the President's order was issued pursuant to a valid delega-
tion of legislative authority.
The Aquino administration will propose long overdue reforms in
immigration law to Congress, by means of a proposed bill to abolish
the CID and create the Commission on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion, and a proposed Immigration and Naturalization Code to replace
the existing law.
This article outlines some basic issues of immigration law that will
be discussed during this process of reform. These issues, each of
which constitutes a separate section, include the legal basis for depor-
tation under Philippine jurisprudence; the power to issue a warrant of
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arrest against an alien; the power to grant bail to an alien under deten-
tion; and the power of judicial review over deportation cases.
II. LEGAL BASIS FOR DEPORTATION
The Philippine Immigration Act' antedates Philippine indepen-
dence in 1945.2 Yet, jurisprudence is scanty, particularly on the power
of the Immigration Commissioner to cause the arrest and search of
suspected aliens. Fortunately, the more serious questions of constitu-
tional law were settled by the Supreme Court in the recent landmark
case of Harvey v. Commissioner Santiago, promulgated on June 28,
1988, and written by Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera.
3
The Philippine Supreme Court, in one of its earliest decided cases,
had based the power to deport aliens on the right of the state to exist-
ence and to development. Further, the Court said that the power to
deport rests on the right of every state to "the integrity of its territory
and exclusive and peaceful possession of its dominions which it may
guard and defend by all possible means against any attack." The
Court explained:
The power of the President to deport undesirable aliens is plenary and is
free from interference on the part of the judicial power. He is the sole
judge of the facts and circumstances which require the deportation of the
aliens and cannot be required to show reasonable grounds for his belief
to a court of justice.
4
The deportation of aliens is a police measure; its objective is the
purging of obnoxious foreigners. It is a preventive, not a penal pro-
cess, and it cannot be substituted for criminal prosecution and punish-
ment by judicial procedure. The enforcement of this power to deport
aliens belongs peculiarly to the political departments of the govern-
ment. Since the power belongs to the political departments of the gov-
ernment, it need not be defined by express legislation, although in
Philippine jurisdiction, Congress has prescribed the conditions and the
methods under which and by which the power should be exercised.5
Its exercise is a function of the civil and political departments of the
government, unless taken over by the military commander by the as-
sumption of civil as well as of military power in the territory under his
command.
6
1. Commonwealth Act, No. 613 (Phil. 1940).
2. The Immigration Act was approved by the U.S. President on August 26, 1940 and pro-
claimed by the Philippine President on September 3, 1940.
3. Harvey v. Commissioner Santiago, G.R. No. 82544, slip op. (June 28, 1988).
4. In re Patterson, I Phil. 93 (1902).
5. Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 543 (1910).
6. In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 97 (1918).
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A sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from
its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for the public
interest.7 Such power is based on the accepted maxim of international
law that every sovereign nation has the inherent power, essential to
self-preservation, to forbid entrance of foreigners within its
dominions.8
In Harvey, the Supreme Court reiterated these legal bases for the
exercise of the power to deport undesirable aliens by the state. The
court, noting that immigration agents had arrested the petitioners on
the suspicion that they practiced pederasty with Filipino child prosti-
tutes in the resort town of Pagsanjan, affirmed the right to deport un-
desirable aliens whose presence is found to be injurious to the public
good. The court emphasized that the state particularly has this right
where it
has expressly committed itself to defend the right of the children to
assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cru-
elty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development
(Art. XV, Sec. 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and De-
portation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, ac-
ted in the interest of the state.9
Philippine Immigration Law provides for deportation by either one
of two ways. 'o The first way is provided for by the Immigration Act,
section 37, which provides for the arrest and deportation of an enu-
merated class of aliens, "after a determination by the Board of Com-
missioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien."" The second way is provided for by the Adminis-
trative Code, section 69, which provides for the power of the President
to deport an alien upon prior investigation.'
2
Under the Immigration Act, the power to deport is exercised by
the Commissioner, after a determination of deportability is made by
the Board of Commissioners. Under the Administrative Code, the
power to deport is exercised by the President. However, by a series of
7. Lao Tan Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948).
8. Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562 (1967).
9. Harvey, slip op. at 13-14.
10. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963).
11. Immigration Act, § 37, para. (a) (1940).
12. Admin. Code § 69: Deportation of subject of a foreign power. A subject of a foreign
power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said islands or
repatriated to his own country by the President except upon prior investigation, conducted by
said executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In
such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he
shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the
right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses.
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executive orders, the President eventually delegated his power to the
Board of Commissioners. 13 The result is that the power to deport is
now exercised fully by the Commissioner.
III. POWER TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST
Whether the Commissioner has the power to issue a warrant of
arrest has been an emotionally-charged issue in Philippine jurispru-
dence. The answer to the issue hinges on the interpretation of the
constitutional provisions for this power. The 1935 Constitution
provided:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.14
Under the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that only a
judge could issue a warrant of arrest, if the purpose was to determine
the existence of probable cause. But apparently, the Commissioner
could issue a warrant to carry out a final order of deportation. The
Court said:
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the
case of Rodriguez v. Villamiel, (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not
the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is
placed among the rights of the accused. Under our constitution, the
same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputa-
bly it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Fur-
thermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our
Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon
which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the
judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the wit-
nesses he may produce. This requirement - "to be determined by the
judge" - is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify
who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their
provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the legislature to
make such a determination and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest.
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is,* therefore, even doubt-
ful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority
other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence
of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Con-
stitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one sus-
13. Exec. Order No. 398 (1947); Exec order No. 455 (1951).
14. Phil. Const. art. III, § 1, para. 3 (1935, repealed 1945).
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pected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the
probable cause against him by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it
is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly au-
thorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the
Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for exam-
ple, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deporta-
tion, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner
is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only
when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To
carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power
to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investiga-
tion, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as
was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be
required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as
was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it
may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding - and nothing
herein said is intended to so decide - on whether or not the President
himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation
only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We
are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without de-
ciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien
complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation
Board.
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an
individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the
same, to determine whether under specific circumstances, the curtail-
ment of the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact that the Con-
stitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribes the manner
by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the
issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination
of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person
issuing the same. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of
arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties
may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion
and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of
power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on
the matter under discussion, that would serve as a curtailment or limita-
tion on the fundamental rights of a person, such as his security to life
and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the
guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is so, then a delegation
of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to
the liberties of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.
We are not unaware of the statements made by this Court in the case
of Tan Sin v. Deportation Board (G.R. No. L-1151, Nov. 28, 1958) It
may be stated, however, that the power of arrest was not squarely raised
Winter 19891
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in that proceeding, but only as a consequence of therein petitioner's
proposition that the President had no inherent power to deport and that
the charges filed against him did not constitute ground for deportation. 1 5
In the next case, Dalamal v. Deportation Board, the Supreme Court
again placed a strict interpretation on the constitutional provision, and
ruled that nothing in the Administrative Code authorized the Presi-
dent to issue a warrant of arrest against an alien in the course of his
investigation, with a view to determining if he was liable for deporta-
tion. The court quoted the constitutional provision, and noted that
the court was divided on whether a warrant could be issued by a per-
son other than a judge. The court confessed:
On this point, there is a difference of opinion on the part of the members
of the court; some expressed the view that the pertinent provision of our
constitution only refers to criminal proceedings where a judge is the sole
arbiter, while the other members opined that it involves both criminal as
well as administrative proceedings. We will not, however, elaborate on
this point, it being unnecessary for the decision of this case.
16
The court said that when the President exercised his power of deporta-
tion, he did so not only as an act of state, but also "under the com-
bined powers of the President and the Legislature."' 7 The President
had the power to issue a warrant of arrest, but this power could not be
delegated. The court continued:
As an act of state, the President has the inherent power to order the
deportation of an alien and as incident thereof, his arrest, while at the
same time that power may be deemed vested in him through delegation
by the legislature through the enactment of an appropriate statute (Sec-
tion 69, Revised Administrative Code). But insofar as his power to or-
der the arrest of an alien is concerned, either as a measure to insure his
appearance at the investigation proceedings to determine if he is liable to
deportation, or an incident of his inherent power to deport to make effec-
tive his deportation order, assuming only arguendo that he has such inci-
dental power, that power cannot be delegated either under the principle
of delegata potesta non potest delegare, or upon the theory that it is non-
delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment or discretion.
18
However, the Commissioner has the power to issue a warrant of
arrest, in connection with the provision of the Immigration Act that
the Commissioner has the power to exact bonds to insure the appear-
ance of aliens released from custody during the course of deportation
proceedings. 19
15. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA at 35-38.
16. Dalamal v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 385 (1963).
17. Id. at 386.
18. Id. (citation omitted).
19. Immigration Act, § 40, para (a).
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In one 1964 case, an overstaying Chinese temporary visitor filed a
cash bond, undertaking that he would not be employed or engaged in
any business enterprise incompatible with his status without the writ-
ten consent previously granted by the Commissioner. Contrary to the
stipulation of his bond, the alien was employed as manager of a shop.
Consequently, the Commissioner ordered his bond confiscated in favor
of the government, and directed the alien to file a new cash bond and a
surety bond, on pain of arrest and detention. Petitioners disputed the
Commissioner's authority to order such arrest, on the theory that the
power was vested only in a judge. This gave the court an opportunity
to affirm that the Commissioner has the power to issue a warrant of
arrest against an alien who has violated the condition of his bond. The
court ruled:
This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To
as a temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations as
contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of
breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person
in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing
but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the
Commissioner to prepare the ground for deportation under section 37(a)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613. A contrary interpretation would render
such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.
20
The Immigration Act, section 37, paragraph (a), explicitly gives to
the Commissioner the power to issue a warrant of arrest. In the later
Lao Alfonso v. Vivo, 2 1 the Supreme Court upheld this provision and
clarified that it authorizes two kinds of warrants. Thus:
Clearly, the above-quoted section 3(a) speaks of two warrants - one for
the arrest and the other for the deportation of the alien. The warrant of
arrest is issued by the Commissioner of Immigration 'upon a determina-
tion by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.' Note that the concurrence or
approval by the Board of Immigration Commissioners is not required for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. For in stating that the Commissioner
of Immigration or any officer designated by him may thus issue such a
warrant, section 37(a) authorizes the said Commissioner to apprehend
undesirable aliens and initiate their expulsion on any of the grounds enu-
merated thereunder.
22
Even so, the petitioners in the 1967 case of Morano v. Vivo squarely
put in issue the constitutionality of the Commissioner's power to issue
a warrant of arrest. Petitioners argued that the constitution limits to
judges the authority to issue an arrest warrant, and that the legislative
20. Ng Hua To v. Galang, 10 SCRA 411 (1964).
21. Lao Alfonso v. Vivo, 16 SCRA 510 (1966).
22. Id. at 515.
Winter 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
delegation of this power to the Commissioner violated the Bill of
Rights. The Supreme Court categorically upheld the Commissioner's
power to issue a warrant of arrest. It ruled:
Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not re-
quire judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation
issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contem-
plates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step prelim-
inary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or
administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid
decision by a competent official, such as legal order of deportation, is-
sued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legis-
lation. . . . In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in
section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the
issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. The view we here express finds support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Convention. The convention rec-
ognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities of and cases of depri-
vation of liberty, other than by order of a competent court.... It is in
this context that we rule that section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940 is not constitutionally proscribed.
23
However, the broad view taken by the Morano court was subse-
quently restricted in a succeeding case, where the court said "that the
issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration,
solely for purposes of investigation, and before a final order of deporta-
tion is issued," conflicted with the Constitution. 24 The Court con-
cluded that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of
arrest was limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively.
The court, citing Morano, emphasized the distinction between admin-
istrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order, and arrest
as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. Accordingly,
the court voided the Commissioner's warrants of arrest, but said that
the Commissioner could require the aliens to furnish bonds to guaran-
tee their appearance at the hearings and to other proceedings.
25
Following this strict view, the Supreme Court in 1969 ruled that
no warrant of arrest could be issued by immigration authorities before
a final order of deportation was made. "For until it is established that
an alien lawfully admitted gained entry into the country through ille-
gal means and the expulsion is finally decreed, the arrest cannot be
ordered."
26
In 1970, the strict interpretation in Neria v. Vivo of the Commis-
23. Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562, 568-570 (1967).
24. Vivo v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 (1968).
25. Id. at 155, 156 (1968).
26. Neria v. Vivo, 29 SCRA 701, 708 (1969).
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sioner's power was reiterated in Contemprate v. Acting Commis-
sioner,27 where the court characterized the rule to be firmly
established:
The rule now established in this jurisdiction circumscribes the authority
to issue the same only to judges, where the purpose of the warrant is
merely the determination of the existence of probable cause in a given
case, with the power of the Immigration Commissioner to issue similar
warrants being confined to those necessary for the execution of a final
deportation order.
28
This period was followed by the promulgation of the 1973 Consti-
tution during the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos, and
the eventual promulgation of the 1987 Constitution during the admin-
istration of President Corazon Aquino. The present provision of the
1987 Constitution approximates the provision of the 1935 Constitu-
tion, under which the prior rulings were made.
29
Under the 1987 Constitution, the present Supreme Court in Har-
vey upheld the Commissioner's power to issue a warrant of arrest. The
court said that the provision of the Immigration Act giving this power
to the Commissioner "should be construed in its entirety in view of the
summary and not indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding,
otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceedings would be
defeated.
' '30
The court, pointedly quoting a passage from Morano, said that the
Immigration Act provision granting to the Commissioner the power to
issue warrant of arrest, is not constitutionally proscribed:
The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which
are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal
in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administra-
tive in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a pun-
ishment. It is a preventive, not a penal process. It need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. 31
In the earlier case of Vivo v. Montesa,32 the Supreme Court had
ruled that the Commissioner could not issue a warrant of arrest solely
27. Contemprate v. Acting Comm'r of Immigration, 35 SCRA 623 (1970).
28. Id. at 631.
29. Phil. Const. of 1987, art. III, § 2. provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviola-
ble, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the com-
plainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
30. Harvey, slip op. at 8.
31. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
32. Vivo v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 (1968).
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for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation
was issued. In Harvey, the court said that the Montesa statement
could not be invoked, because the Commissioner's warrant of arrest
did not order petitioners to appear and show cause, but instead a war-
rant was issued after probable cause had already been determined dur-
ing the preliminary investigation. Since deportation proceedings had
already been commenced with the filing of a charge sheet, the arrest,
as a step preliminary to deportation, was valid. For to rule otherwise
would be to render nugatory the authority given to the Commissioner,
to the detriment of the state.
33
In Harvey, the court underscored the Morano statement that the
requirements of probable cause, to be determined by a judge, do not
extend to deportation proceedings. "There need be no 'truncated' re-
course to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deporta-
tion proceeding."
' 34
In its ratio decidendi, the Harvey Court emphasized that its ruling
did not deviate from the ruling in the prior case of Qua Chee Gan,3 5
which had been reiterated in Montesa, that under the express terms of
the 1935 Constitution, "it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest
of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if
the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation."' 36 The court emphasized
that the warrants were valid, because probable cause had already been
shown to exist before the warrants were issued. 37
IV. POWER TO GRANT BAIL
The Immigration Act provides that the Commissioner shall have
the power to determine release on bail: "Any alien under arrest in a
deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such
other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner."3"
This power has been upheld by the courts.39 In a landmark case,
the Supreme Court categorically ruled that the discretionary power to
grant bail lies with the Commissioner, for the alien does not have a
constitutional right to bail:
Aliens in deportation proceedings, as a rule, have no inherent right to
33. Harvey, slip op. at 11.
34. Harvey, slip op. at 11.
35. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963).
36. Harvey, slip op. at 12 (quoting Qua Chee Gan).
37. Id. at 12.
38. Immigration Act, section 37, para. (e).
39. E.g. Tiu v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-10009, (1958).
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bail;, and it has been held that a person arrested or detained cannot be
released on bail, unless that right is granted expressly by law....
Note that this provision confers upon the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion the power and discretion to grant bail in deportation proceedings,
but does not grant to aliens the right to be released on bail. The use of
the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is
merely permissive and not mandatory or obligatory on the part of the
Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary.
The determination as to the propriety of allowing an alien, subject to
deportation under the Immigration Act, to be released temporarily on
bail, as well as the conditions thereof, is solely within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Commissioner, and not in the courts of justice. The reason
for this is that the courts do not administer immigration laws.
Even so, the power to grant bail, it seems, has to be exercised by the
Commissioner while the alien is still under investigation, for there is no
provision of law expressly authorizing such release after the order of de-
portation has been issued by the Board of Immigration.
The right to bail granted by the constitution may not be invoked in
favor of petitioners-appellees, considering that deportation proceedings
do not constitute a criminal action, it being merely for the return to the
country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could
continue to reside within our borders .... The case at bar is a deporta-
tion proceeding under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which
expressly vests in the Commissioner of Immigration the exclusive and
full discretion to determine whether an alien subject to deportation
should or should not be granted bail. And the fact that petitioners-ap-
pellees herein instituted the present habeus corpus proceedings before
the Court of First Instance of Manila does not place them in the custody
of said court, so as to deprive the Commissioner of Immigration of the
supervision over them and over the discretionary power to grant bail.
4°
In the same way, the Supreme Court has held that when an alien is
detained by the Commissioner, the regular court of justice has no
power to release the alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings,
because there is no law authorizing it. That case involved an alien
held for deportation upon orders of the President. The court said that
the alien may not be released on bail. 4 1 However, in the prevailing
case of Harvey, the Supreme Court once again explicitly ruled: "[I]n
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a
matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner .... -42
The Harvey court recited, the provision of the Immigration Act
governing the alien's release "under bond or under such other condi-
tions as may be imposed by the Commissioner," emphasizing that the
40. Ong See Hang v. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442, 446-48 (1962) (citations
omitted).
41. Republic v. Cloribel, 9 SCRA 453 (1963).
42. Harvey, slip op. at 12.
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use of the word "may" indicates that grant of bail is merely permissive
and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner.
43
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER DEPORTATION
Deportation cases are heard by a three-person court called the
Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI"). There are three such boards. After
a hearing, the BSI makes a recommendation and attaches a draft deci-
sion to the Board of Immigration Commissioners, which consist of the
Commissioner and the two Associate Commissioners. 44
The factual findings of the Board of Special Inquiry are not final
and conclusive upon the Board of Commissioners. The Immigration
Act provides that the Commissioner exercises general supervision and
control over the staff services and operating branches and units of the
Commission. 45 Hence, the Board of Commissioners may review, on
appeal, the decision - including the findings of fact - of the BSI.
46
In exclusion cases, the regular court of justice has no power to over-
rule the findings of fact of the immigration authorities, unless such
findings are manifestly unfair or the conclusions of the immigration
authorities are arbitrary.
47
If a deportation proceeding is pending before the Board of Com-
missioners, and it does not appear that the Board is guilty of undue
delay, the court will dismiss the appeal as being a premature petition
for certiorari. The court will not interfere, "unless it is shown that the
deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of await-
ing a chance for deportation or unless the Government admits that it
cannot deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a
period."
'48
In one case, an Associate Commissioner issued an order declaring
petitioners to be citizens of the Philippines. Subsequently, the Com-
missioner reversed, exercising his authority to re-examine and re-eval-
uate the evidence then available in his office, as submitted in an
administrative investigation. Petitioners then filed a petition for man-
damus, to compel the Commissioner to recognize the validity of the
order of the Associate Commissioner, and to restore their Identifica-
43. Id. at 12-13.
44. The deportation Rules of Procedure are prescribed by the Commissioner, per Immigra-
tion Act, section 37, para (c).
45. Id. at 2b.
46. Singh v. Board of Commissioners, I SCRA 544 (1961).
47. Id.
48. Bayer v. Board of Commissioners, 3 SCRA 160, 161 (1961).
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tion Certifications as Filipino citizens. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition for mandamus, holding that:
It was unfair and improvident for the Court a quo to grant the peti-
tioner's motion for new trial on certain alleged newly-discovered evi-
dence without giving respondent an opportunity to examine and evaluate
the evidence on which it predicated its amended decision. It was tanta-
mount to overruling the decision of respondent on a matter which was
never submitted to him for consideration.
49
In Commissioner v. Fernandez, the Court clarified that a new
Board of Commissioners does not have authority to review the deci-
sions of its predecessor board, but only that of the BSI. The review of
the Board of Commissioners, if authorized, should be made in accord-
ance with the process established by law, with a view to protecting the
rights of individuals.50
The case involved a petition for habeas corpus presented by a per-
son who had already been declared to be a Filipino citizen, but who
was being deported as an alien. The trial court dismissed the petition
for habeas corpus. The petitioner then filed an appeal from the deci-
sion of the trial court with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
and ordered the release on bail pending such appeal.5'
A petition for mandamus or for a writ of certiorari will not lie
against the Commissioner in order to obtain a visa extension. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Commissioner has no ministerial duty
to grant a petition for extension of the period of an alien's stay in the
Philippines. If the Commissioner denies the extension, then it is the
Commissioner's duty to proceed against the temporary visitor and his
bond upon the expiration of his right to stay in the country.
52
In the landmark case of Vivo v. Arca,53 respondent aliens were able
to obtain an extension of their temporary stay. Subsequently, the
Commissioner required them to leave, but the trial judge issued a pre-
liminary injunction against the enforcement of the Commissioner's or-
der. The Commissioner filed a petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court held that the refusal of the trial court to dis-
solve a preliminary injunction after the expiration of the alien visitor's
authorized stay in the country constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
The court granted the writ of certiorari and annulled and set aside the
49. Sy Ha v. Galang, 7 SCRA 797 (1963).
50. Commissioner v. Fernandez, 11 SCRA 184 (1964).
51. Id.
52. Guan v. Commissioner, 15 SCRA 451 (1965).
53. Vivo v. Arca, 22 SCRA 805 (1968). This ruling was a reiteration of Vivo v. Cloribel, 18
SCRA 713 (1966).
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preliminary injunction issued by the respondent judge. 4
In a similar case, petitioners obtained an extension of temporary
stay. After the deadline, the Commissioner required the aliens to
leave the country. Instead of departing, respondents filed a petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction with a trial court, in order
to prevent their arrest and deportation. The judge gave due course to
the petition and issued the preliminary injunction. The Commissioner
moved for dismissal, but the judge denied the motion. Subsequently,
the Commissioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The Supreme
Court, citing the previous ruling in Vivo v. Arca, ruled that the judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the
petition, and set aside the orders of the trial judge.55
To stop the practice of trial judges issuing preliminary injunctions
against the Commissioner's orders of deportation against overstaying
aliens, the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Arca, seized the oppor-
tunity to make a categorical ruling:
Extensions of stay of aliens are discretionary on the part of immigration
authorities, and neither a petition for mandamus nor one for certiorari
can compel the Commissioner of Immigration to extend the stay of an
alien whose period of stay has expired. Should the actuations of the
Commissioner be unsatisfactory, the parties concerned should address
themselves to the President of the Philippines who by law has the final
authority on such questions of deportation. Applicable jurisprudence,
therefore, plainly shows the lower court to have erred in entertaining the
case and enjoining further actions which the Commissioner was duty
bound to carry out. 5
6
The Supreme Court continued to support the Commissioner against
efforts to limit his deportation powers. In the landmark case of Vivo v.
Montesa,5 7 the court explained:
The Court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation pro-
ceedings of respondents Calacdays. These proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of the immigration authorities under sections 29 and 37 of
the Philippine Immigration Act. That jurisdiction is not tolled by a
claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners
have reliable evidence to the contrary, and said officers should be given
opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts inter-
fere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative
decisions.
It is well to note that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition
54. 22 SCRA at 805.
55. Vivo v. Cloribel, 22 SCRA 159, 164-65 (1968).
56. Commissioner v. Arca, 22 SCRA 805, 808 (1968).
57. Vivo v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 (1968). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against the respon-
dents but had not been implemented. In view of the non-completion of
the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet
any decision. The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not being de-
ported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing
where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respon-
dents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review.5 8
Finally, the Supreme Court has clarified when an alien can go to
court. If the alien claims to be a citizen and therefore not subject to
deportation, the alien has the right to have citizenship reviewed by the
court. However, where the deportation proceedings have not yet been
completed, the alien cannot yet avail himself of judicial remedies.5 9
58. Id. at 155-56.
59. Calacday v. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 (1970).
